Physics applied to biology typically assumes that living matter is nonliving matter arranged with unusual complexity. Biological physics — distinguished here from biophysics — claims otherwise (arXiv:2603.11234). Living matter is a distinct form of matter, not a configuration of the standard forms.
Note (2026-11-09): The abstract (Newman and Sarkar) does give examples for each category: generic (subunit communication by diffusion in cellular slime molds), biogeneric (subunit demixing in animal embryos) and nongeneric, 'pertaining to sui generis materials' (budding of active solids in plants). It also says that at the scale of the single cell living matter is 'nonunitary' with features unlike any material of the nonliving world, situates the view in dialectical materialism and multilevel physicalism, and contrasts it with informationism and genetic reductionism. The essay's statement that whether any process is truly without a nonliving analog is an open empirical question the paper frames but does not resolve, and its claim that the boundary is 'ontological', are not in the abstract.
The distinction plays out in process taxonomy. Multicellular living systems sustain three categories of physical process: generic (shared with nonliving matter — diffusion, elasticity, surface tension), biogeneric (analogous to nonliving processes but implemented through cellular machinery — like pattern formation that uses gene regulation instead of chemical gradients), and nongeneric (unique to living systems — processes with no nonliving analog).
The third category is the structural claim. If nongeneric processes exist — physical processes that occur only in living matter and have no analog in any nonliving system — then living matter is not a subset of condensed matter with extra complexity. It is a separate domain with its own physics. The boundary between biology and physics is not organizational but ontological.
Whether this is correct depends on whether any biological process is truly without nonliving analog, which is an empirical question the paper frames but does not resolve. But the framing itself is precise: the test for whether biology reduces to physics is not whether living systems are made of physical components (they obviously are) but whether they sustain processes that nonliving arrangements of the same components cannot.