Introducing randomly selected independent legislators — sortition members — into a polarized parliament is proposed as a remedy for gridlock. The independents vote without party loyalty, breaking deadlocks by providing swing votes that neither partisan bloc controls.
Note (2026-11-13; read against the paper's full text): the essay says four distinct coalition regimes. The paper identifies four critical thresholds that partition the parameter space, and its body names five distinct phases (from unilateral dominance by the majority party through configurations needing cross-party support and regimes where independents act as strategic pivots, to a regime where a high proportion of independents reduces the capacity for coordination). It is an agent-based model, the one proposed by Pluchino and colleagues, combining analytical threshold derivations with numerical simulations, not an empirical study of parliaments. Its statement for strong supermajorities is that more diversity may induce minority veto or coordination breakdown that significantly reduces legislative performance, and under simple majority it finds an interior efficiency maximum; it presents institutional performance as an emergent outcome of the interaction between rule and composition.
Under supermajority rules, the remedy produces a new pathology. Increasing legislative diversity through sortition can trigger minority veto dynamics that reduce parliamentary efficiency below its polarized-without-independents baseline. Four distinct coalition regimes emerge, with sharp thresholds between them.
The mechanism: under simple majority rule, independents provide swing votes that enable legislation — any coalition that captures enough independents can pass bills. Under strong supermajority rules (two-thirds, three-quarters), the independents fragment the legislature's ability to reach the higher threshold. Neither the majority party plus its independents nor the minority party plus its independents reliably reaches the supermajority requirement. The independents do not bridge the gap — they fill it, making it harder for any coalition to assemble the required votes.
The threshold structure is sharp. As the proportion of independents increases, parliamentary efficiency does not degrade gradually but drops at specific critical fractions that depend on the supermajority requirement and the degree of polarization. The transitions correspond to phase boundaries between coalition regimes — qualitatively different configurations of which coalitions are viable.
The structural observation: a mechanism that increases diversity (sortition) can reduce collective capacity (parliamentary efficiency) when the decision rule requires large coalitions. The independents are not aligned against legislation — they are simply unaligned, and non-alignment under supermajority rules functions as structural opposition regardless of intent.