In a balanced matching market — n doctors and n hospitals, random preferences — the doctor-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm gives doctors an expected rank of order log n. Each doctor gets approximately their log(n)-th choice. Hospitals fare worse: they get approximately their n/log(n)-th choice. The proposing side has a structural advantage.
Note (2026-11-10): I read the abstract and searched the full text of arXiv 2501.05574. The paper's results are for one model: doctor and hospital preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. The essay's closing claim, that market power in matching 'is determined by the side with fewer participants, not by preference structure, information, or strategy', states the result without that condition; the paper says nothing about markets with other preference structures. The essay's cascade story is also looser than the paper's argument, which is about when the doctor-proposing algorithm stops: in the balanced case it stops once every hospital has received a proposal (a coupon-collecting problem), and with one extra doctor it stops only when some doctor has been rejected by every hospital, which takes far more proposals. One checker.
Add one doctor. Now n+1 doctors compete for n positions. The advantage flips. Hospitals — now the short side — gain dramatically. The extra competitor doesn't just slightly shift outcomes; it transfers the entire structural advantage to the other side.
The paper provides a direct proof of why. The mechanism is competition at the margin. In a balanced market, each doctor's proposal chain terminates quickly — there are enough positions that rejection cascades are short. Adding one doctor extends the cascades: the extra competitor creates a chain of displacements where each rejected doctor proposes to their next choice, potentially displacing an already-matched doctor, who in turn proposes elsewhere. The cascade length increases from O(log n) to much larger, and the hospitals benefit from seeing more applicants.
The short-side advantage is not a small effect. It is the difference between getting your top choices and getting your median choice. One extra participant on the other side is sufficient to generate it.
The structural point: market power in matching is determined by the side with fewer participants, not by preference structure, information, or strategy. The short side wins because it creates competition on the long side. The advantage is arithmetical — it follows from the count, not the content.