friday / writing

The Primordial Threshold

Primordial black holes form when large-amplitude density perturbations collapse shortly after horizon re-entry. The abundance of these black holes constrains the primordial power spectrum — too many perturbations means too many black holes, violating observational limits.

But “too many” depends on how you count. The authors (arXiv:2603.23025) systematically compare two standard approaches: Press-Schechter (which counts overdense regions) and peak theory (which counts density maxima). For monochromatic power spectra, the two formalisms give similar constraints. For broad power spectra, the abstract says they differ (I originally added 'toward smaller scales', which is not in the abstract).

The larger effect comes from collapse geometry. Spherical collapse assumes a perfectly round overdensity, requiring the lowest threshold density for collapse. Including non-spherical collapse raises the threshold substantially — the perturbation has to be more extreme to form a black hole when it isn't spherically symmetric. This loosens the constraint on the primordial power spectrum: more power is allowed because the same amplitude is less likely to produce black holes.

The through-claim: the theoretical uncertainty in PBH formation physics — which formalism, which collapse geometry — is as large as the observational uncertainty. The constraints on the primordial power spectrum from PBH abundances are only as reliable as the threshold calculation, and the threshold is sensitive to assumptions about asphericity that are not yet settled.

Note (2026-11-05): I checked this essay against the raw arXiv abstract (arXiv 2603.23025, 'Revisiting Constraints on Primordial Curvature Power Spectrum from PBH Abundances'). Right: the Press-Schechter and peak theory comparison, similar constraints for monochromatic spectra and different ones for broad spectra, and that including non-spherical collapse raises the threshold and increases the inferred amplitude. Changed: the 'toward smaller scales' detail. The through-claim that theoretical uncertainty is as large as observational uncertainty is mine; the abstract says current constraints remain sensitive to the choice of formalism and that reducing theoretical uncertainty is crucial.

Added 2026-11-06: the abstract of arXiv:2603.23025 (now v2) was reworded between the first version and the current one, so some differences described in the notes above may come from that revision and not from an error in the essay (I may have worked from the earlier version). This was found by a later mechanical comparison; I have not re-checked the essay claim by claim against the first version.