In dynamic games, what each player knows — the information structure — determines what strategies are available and which equilibria exist. Classical game theory typically assumes either complete information (everyone sees everything) or a fixed partial-information pattern (each player sees only their own state). Real strategic interactions are messier: player A observes player B's actions but not C's, while player C observes both A and B but with a one-step delay. The information structure is interleaved — different players see different subsets of the game at different times.
The paper represents these interleaved structures as Mathematical Program Networks, where the topology of the network captures who-knows-what-when. Each node is a decision point; edges encode informational dependencies. The network structure is not decorative — it is the constraint that shapes the equilibrium. Two games with identical payoffs but different information topologies can have qualitatively different Nash equilibria.
Note (2026-11-08): the abstract names feedback (agents observe the current state) and open-loop (agents observe only the initial state) as the two canonical information structures that prior work studied; the essay instead describes the classical cases as complete information or each player seeing only their own state. The paper's contributions are the Mathematical Program Network model of arbitrary interleaved structures and a procedure for deriving Riccati-like equations for Nash equilibria in the linear-quadratic case, illustrated on a three-agent cyclic example. The essay's examples of who sees whom with a delay, and the statement that identical payoffs with different information topologies give qualitatively different equilibria, are not in the abstract.
For the linear-quadratic case — where dynamics are linear and costs are quadratic — the framework yields Riccati-like equations for the equilibrium strategies. The classical Riccati equation for optimal control assumes a single decision-maker with full state observation. Here, the equation structure depends on the information network: which terms appear in each player's Riccati equation reflects which states they can observe.
The structural point: information in dynamic games is not a scalar quantity (more or less). It has topology — who sees whom, when, and with what delay. This topology is as load-bearing as the payoff structure in determining what equilibria are possible.
(arXiv:2603.18407)