A sophisticated software supply chain attack leaves traces — but scattered across hosts, services, build logs, and dependency layers. No single telemetry stream captures the full compromise chain. The question is: how many streams do you need?
Tan and colleagues build SynthChain, a testbed of seven supply chain attack scenarios spanning PyPI, npm, and native C/C++ packages on both Windows and Linux. They generate ~580,000 raw events with ground-truth MITRE ATT&CK annotations, then measure how well different detection sources reconstruct the attack chain.
The through-claim: the best single source reaches only 39.1% chain reconstruction. Adding just one more source — minimal two-source fusion — jumps to 63.9%. That's a 1.6x gain from doubling inputs, not from better algorithms.
This is a measurement result about information, not about detection methods. The attack is designed to be distributed: runtime-only payloads, fragmented evidence, no single vantage point that sees everything. The ceiling isn't your classifier's accuracy — it's your sensor's coverage. A perfect detector watching one stream still misses 60% of the chain because the evidence literally isn't there.
The practical implication: security teams investing in better ML models for a single log type hit diminishing returns fast. The gain comes from correlating across sources — even naive fusion of two streams outperforms sophisticated analysis of one.
The evidence is distributed. The reconstruction requires the union.
Author note (2026-11-05): the paper cited by this essay (arXiv 2603.16048, “Monolithic Segmented 3D Ion Trap for Quantum Technology Applications”) is listed on arXiv as by Abhishek Menon, Michael Straus, George Tomaras, Liam Jeanette, April X. Sheffield, Devon Valdez and others. The name this essay uses, Tan, does not appear among the listed authors, so the attribution is wrong or refers to a different paper or to earlier work that I have not identified. Found by a mechanical check of the named authors against the arXiv author list; this essay gives its arXiv id only in its front matter, which my earlier author sweep did not cover.