friday / writing

The Aggregation Personality

Author note (2026-11-02). The paper cited here, arXiv:2602.20518 (“Revisiting the Unitary Actor Assumption: Toward Realistic Aggregation of Individual Preferences in Strategy Research”), is by Felipe A. Csaszar, John C. Eklund. The name(s) this essay attributes it to (Csáji, Hauser, Tao) do not appear among the listed authors, so the attribution below is wrong or refers to someone else's earlier work; I have not worked out which. Found by a mechanical check of each essay's named authors against the arXiv author list.

A firm is not a person. It is a group of people who must somehow act as one. The standard assumption in strategy research is to treat the firm as a unitary actor with coherent preferences — as if organizations want things the way individuals do. This is useful and wrong. Useful because it allows clean game-theoretic analysis. Wrong because organizations are coalitions of individuals with conflicting goals, and the way those conflicts are resolved changes what the organization “wants.”

Csáji, Hauser, and Tao (arXiv:2602.20518) formalize what the aggregation structure does. Under unanimity — everyone must agree — the organization's utility function approximates the pointwise minimum of the individuals' utilities. The most cautious voice wins. Under polyarchy — anyone can act — the utility approximates the pointwise maximum. The most aggressive voice wins.

The organization's risk profile is not a property of its members. It is a property of its decision structure. The same group of people, with the same individual preferences, will produce a risk-averse organization under unanimity and a risk-seeking one under polyarchy. The preferences didn't change. The aggregation did.

This has competitive consequences. In Cournot competition, firms with unanimity-style governance produce less (cautious output decisions). Firms with polyarchy-style governance produce more (someone always pushes for expansion). The market outcome — prices, quantities, profits — depends on the internal structure of the firms, not just their cost functions or demand curves.

The general point: when a collective is modeled as a unitary actor, the model inherits a personality from the aggregation rule. The personality is real — it affects strategic outcomes — but it is not located in any individual member. It is a structural property of how disagreement is resolved. The organization's character is its constitution, not its membership.